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Justice Joseph Story: A Study of the
Legal Philosophy of a Jeffersonian Judge
Morgan D. Dowd*
The author here examines the legal philosophy of Justice Joseph
Story. He discusses Story's attempts to reform federal criminal law, his
expansion of judicial review, and the decision of Swift v. Tyson. The
author concludes that Story made two important contributions to the
American legal system-preserving the doctrine of stare decisis and
advancing the theory of the supremacy of national law.

Few studies have sought to explicate the legal philosophy of Joseph
Story despite his enormous reputation as scholar, Supreme Court
justice and professor at the Harvard Law School. Worse still, there
has been little critical analysis of nineteenth-century concepts and
statements of the law.' The purpose of this essay, then, is to examine
the validity of Story's legal theories and to evaluate his work as a
major contributor to American public law. As a result of this study,
it is hoped that progress can be made toward a greater understanding
of the man, the justice, and his philosophy of law.
I. THE LnInmNG FAcroRs IN SToRY's LEGAL PHmosopHy

Justice Story was in great part a child of the eighteenth century.
When Story arrived on the bench the law of reason school was already
on the decline and the era of historical jurisprudence beginning.2
Nevertheless, many of the weaknesses of eighteenth-century rationalism can be found in Story's writings. For one thing his early preoccupation with the doctrine of vested rights led him to assert that
the unwritten law was declaratory of the natural law. Property was
considered by Story aad his contemporaries to be a fundamental
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, State University College, Fredonia, N.Y.
1. Brown, A Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Story Enacted as Law within Thirtysix Days, 26 VA. L. REv. 759 (1940); Cassoday, James Kent and Joseph Story, 12
YALE L.J. 146 (1903); Hogan, Joseph Story's Anonymous Law Articles, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 868 (1954); Hogan, Three Essays on the Law by Joseph Story, 28 So. CAL. L. REV.
19 (1954); Leslie, The Influence of Joseph Story's Theory of the Conflict of Laws on
Constitutional Nationalism, 35 Miss. VALLEY Hsv. REv. 203 (1948); Newmeyer, The
Whig Politics of Justice Story, 48 Miss. VALLEY HIsT. REv. 480 (1961); Pound, The
Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 1 MAss. L.Q. 121 (1916).
2. The following works were consulted on this material: Cows, Am,asA
LAW (1950); PouND,
THouGHT (1954); POUND, THE FOrMATIVE ERA OF A .EsnIcA!
THE SPnrT OF THE COMMON LAw (1921); REUSCHLEN, JUrisPRUDENCE-ITs AMERICAN
PROPHErs (1951) [hereinafter cited as REuscsitEwN].
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"social institution"-a natural right and government existed to protect
such rights. 3 In fact, early Federalists, including Story, were so impressed with natural rights theories that they went so far as to suggest
that the preservation of property was the "primary object of the
social compact."4 The reasons for elevating property to such a level
remained constant. Distrustful of the mass and fearful of state legislative action based on hasty majorities, they courted the federal
judiciary with the hope that the courts would guarantee them their
privileged position in society.
Many states, however, did not respond to the doctrine of vested
rights as promulgated by Federalists. State legislatures tended to
favor land speculators and holders of title to confiscated estates;
very often state judges gave a local construction to deeds, wills and
contracts for the sale of land.5 This countervailing power of the
states led to two alternatives for those who desired the preservation
of vested rights: the federal judiciary could use natural rights arguments to support the case against the invasion of property; or the
federal judges could assume an "indefinite veto power over state
legislation" by citing specific constitutional restraints. Federal courts,
and more especially the Supreme Court, followed the second choice
more frequently. Normative concepts of law were generally avoided
when they involved regulation of legislative conduct. Justices Story
and Marshall were two major exceptions to this rule. Story in parright
ticular used the natural law doctrine to support the private
6
contracts.
private
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obligation
the
and
property
of holding
A. Vested Rights: Real Property

Story's earliest decision involving the identification of private
property with the natural law was Terret v. Taylor.7 Here Story related freedom of religion and natural law to the doctrine of vested
property rights. The Virginia legislature had at one time granted
lands to religious organizations for public worship; later these acts
were repealed. A bill in chancery had been filed by representatives
of the Established Episcopal Church. The suit in equity involved
several complicated land transactions but the main point at issue
was whether Virginia could take away title to lands it once had
vested in a religious society.
194 (1959).
3. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FrEE Socm
4. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795).
5. See MASON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 194-97.
6. See CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION, A STUDY IN AmEuCAN LEGAL Tmnrony (1952);
PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE PoLnCAL PROCEss (1953); RosENDLUM, LAW
AS A POLITCAL INSTRUMENT (1955).
7. Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
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Story, writing the majority opinion, was particularly critical of
Virginia's audacity in treating a well-established church in such a
cavalier manner.
This summary view of so much of the Virginia statutes as bears directly on
the subject in controversy, presents not only a most extraordinary diversity
of opinion in the legislature, as to the nature and propriety of aid in the
temporal concerns of religion, but the more embarrassing considerations of
the constitutional character and efficacy of those laws touching the rights
8
and property of the Episcopal Church.

He attacked the state for assuming that church lands could escheat
as a result of the Revolution. The state could lawfully take only
crown rights: forfeiture of previously created vested rights was impossible. Upon what authority did Story base this interpretation of
the law of confiscation? This principle, he stated categorically, was
"equally consonant with the common sense of mankind and the
maxims of eternal justice." 9 He admitted that the Revolution permitted the Virginia assembly to destroy "compulsive taxation" of the
established church. But that was as far as the egalitarian spirit of
legislative authority extended. Preservation of property was the
major concern of the Constitution. Further weight was added to this
proposition by the acquiescence of a "great majority, if not the whole,
of the very framers of the constitution." 10 Such a doctrine as the
state of Virginia had promulgated was inimical to the good society.
Without any curb on state action, public corporations and vested
property rights could be dissolved without the consent of the interested parties, i.e., the minority. Therefore, Story's decision that the
state of Virginia was prohibited from taking certain church lands was
based on the immutable principles of "natural justice-upon the
fundamental laws of every free government ... 1,
B. Vested Rights: Private Contracts
Justice John Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck 12 set in motion a series
of decisions which promoted national judicial regulation of the contract clause.' 3 When Marshall declared that the revocation of land
grants was unconstitutional (since it involved the sanctity of a private
8. Id. at 48.

9. Id. at 50.
10. Id. at 51.
11. Id. at 52.

12. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).

13. "From the Nation's beginning, the States had lax notions as to the sacredness
of public contracts, and often violated the obligations of them." 3 B-IEamrnE, LIFE
or JoHN M SHALL 557 (1919); THE MIscELLANEoUs WRmrincs OF JOSEPH STORY
653-56 (Story ed. 1852). See also ScrwARz & HoGr, JOSEPH STORy 120-52 (1959).
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contract) he was echoing Alexander Hamilton's sentiment that such
action by state legislatures was contrary to the "first principles of
national justice and social policy." 14 The question remained, however,
whether corporate charters as well as public grants were protected
under the aegis of article I, section 10 of the Constitution. The
Dartmouth College case decided in 1819 by Marshall and Story
sought to answer that issue. 15
Justice Marshall's analysis of the Dartmouth College controversy
can be broken down into two questions. Was the contract in question protected by the federal constitution? And if so, was the contract
impaired by the state legislative acts? The Chief Justice related
the charter to a contract; contracts which were mentioned in the
Constitution pertained only to those dealing with private property
and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice.1
Charters contained rights; therefore, the Constitution recognized a
charter as a contract and protected it as private property. Stretching
the case to cover every possible loophole, Marshall concluded that
while it was true legislatures had certain powers to annul corporate
rights, still, in the final analysis, a valid contract continued in existence.
He affirmed this principle despite the fact that the original donors
no longer had any actual interest in the property. The state acts
were declared to be unconstitutional as violating the impairment of
contract.'1

Justice Story wrote a concurring opinion and approached the
case on a different level. Not only was his opinion sweeping in
respect to its coverage of common law corporations, but it related the
contract clause to the doctrine of vested rights and natural law. The
touchstone of Story's decision in the Dartmouth case lay, however,
not in his review of corporations, charters, or contracts, but rested
14. SCHmIDHAUSER, THE SuPREmE COURT, ITS POLrICS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROCEDuRES 71 (1960). For a general discussion of the contract clause, see WRIGHT, THE

CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONsTrrurnoN (1938).

15. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
Background reading which proved helpful to the Dartmouth case included: HAINES,
THE ROLE OF TE SUPREmE COURT r AamucAN GOVERIMENT AND PoLMcs, 17891835, 379-423 (1960); Fairman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations
on State Governmental Authority, 21 U. CH. L. REV. 40 (1953); Hagan, The Dartmouth College Case, 19 GEo. L.J. 411 (1931); Harris, Judicial Review in the United
States of America, 56 DicK. L. REv. 177 (1952).
16. See HUNTnNG, THE OBLIGATION OF CoNTRAcrs CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTrTUON (1919); Issacs, John Marshall on Contracts: A Study in Early American
Juristic Theory, 7 VA. L. REV. 413 (1921); Stinson, Marshall and the Supremacy of the
Unwritten Law, 18 Alr. L. REv. 856-57 (1924); Mendelson, John Marshall's Short
Way with Statutes, 6 Ky. L.J. 284-89 (1948).
17. The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note 15, at 629. See
POLInCAL
also CORIvN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTrUTION (1919); OsTEn, Tr
AND EcoNoMuc DOCrRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL (1914).
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solely on the question which Marshall chose to evade. Was the
charter dissolved at the time of the Revolution and thus reduced to
a mere nullity by 1775?18 Story answered this query by reviving a
common law decision of Lord Thurlow. 19 He believed it was a
principle of the common law as well as international law that when
an empire was divided it did not foreclose rights of property already
vested. Such a maxim he found was consonant with "the common
sense of mankind, and the maxims of eternal justice."2 0 Thus, in the
Dartmouth case Story posited the doctrine of "acquired rights" and
tied it to the natural law. In this 21way he hoped to place the decision
on the broadest possible footing.
The Dartmouth decision provided a good example of how Marshall
and Story were in effect writing into the Constitution their own
economic, political and social philosophies.22 Story went much further
than John Marshall in narrowing the legitimate areas of state competency. The impact of the Dartmouth College case was not felt
immediately. In time, the decision was incorporated into the struggle
between those favoring the growth of public corporations (public
power theorists) and those seeking the protection of corporate rights
at the state level (private power theorists). And at the turn of the
century the doctrine of natural rights was resurrected and used to
justify corporate monopolies.23
II. TImE PosrrvE FAcToRs IN STORYIs LEGAL PHILosoPHY
Three American jurists were primarily responsible for the transformation of common law principles as they emerged into a national
system of law. 24 Chief Justice Marshall in his famed constitutional
interpretations laid the framework for judicial review by incorporating
the common law into the federal constitution. Chancellor Kentcelebrated New York judge, writer and teacher-exercised considerable
18. Trustees of Darmouth College v. Woodward, supra note 15, at 696. See also
Jenkins, Should the Dartmouth College Decision be Recalled? 51 AM. L. REv. 711

(1917).

19. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note 15, at 707.
20. Ibid.
21. The doctrine of "acquired rights" is discussed in GOULD, AN IN RoDUcTioN -ro
INTmATONAL LAW 507-33 (1957). See also Leslie, The Influence of Joseph Story's
Theory of the Conflict of Laws on Constitutional Nationalism, 35 Miss. VALLEY EhST.
REv. 203 (1948).
22. BAum, CoMMENTArms ox THE CoNsTroN, 1790-1860 (1952); Mendelson,
Sectional Politics and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 9 J. POL. 255 (1947): Moses,
The Friendship between Marshalland Story, 35 Am. L. Ruv. 321 (1901).
23. For a very able discussion of the results of the Dartmouth College case, see
Comwir, op. cit. supranote 17, at 167-72.
24. See McCLosimy, THE AMERIcAN SUPREME COUNT (1960) and MENDELSON,
CAPrrAmsM, DEMOCRACY AND =HESuPnEmxE COURT (1960).
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control over the common law as it developed in the states. But it
was Joseph Story's unique opportunity to directly affect the common
law from his vantage point as Supreme Court and district judge,
lecturer in the Harvard Law School and author of systematic classics
on American law. His contributions to American law have been calculated by some to be as great as that of Lord Coke to English jurisprudence.25
One of the limitations of eighteenth-century rationalism was a loss
of vision of past societies. Story, on the contrary, placed great emphasis on time-worn and trusted institutions. He formulated an
historical basis for the political system and showed how it was
confirmed in a written constitution. Moreover, by adeptly employing
the historical method, Story was able to begin work on the codification of American law by comparing it with other legal systems. His
ultimate purpose was to provide the law with a stability that he often
found lacking in democratic institutions. By using the civil law to
buttress his Supreme Court decisions he gave them an international
appeal which in turn prevented a purely provincial jurisprudence."6
III. THE CRimiNAL LAw
The explication and codification of the criminal law became two
of the major goals of Justice Story.27 By applying common law rules
and showing their logical relationship to comparative legal principles
Story formulated the doctrine that criminal jurisprudence should
develop along the lines of judicial guidance rather than legislative
deliberation. In Story's first full term the Supreme Court considered
the question of a federal common law of crimes. Justice Johnson in
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 8 speaking for the majority,
emphasized judicial restraint in matters where Congress bad not delegated jurisdiction. It was a rule of constitutional law, he said, that
the federal courts did not have criminal jurisdiction in common law
cases. Story disagreed privately with Johnson but prudence dictated
that he should not dissent,29
25. Story's reputation was well established in his lifetime. See REuscH_ im. 52.
26. Letter From Joseph Story to Francis Lieber, Aug. 15, 1837, quoted in 2 Li.E
AND LETTEs OF JOSEPH STORY 277-79 (Story ed. 1851); Letter From Joseph Story to
John Hall, Sept. 1, 1821, Hall MSS, Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio.
27. CoDIFIcATIoN OF THE C0-IMON LAW, REPORT OF COMIISSIONS IN MASSACHUsErs TO D='EAnmJNE EXPEDENCE AND PRACnCAmTY OF REDUCING COMMON LAW TO

CODE, in THE MIsCELLANEous WRINGs OF JOSEPH STORY 696-734 (Story ed. 1852).
28. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).

29. Professor Crosskey takes the position that the four Republican judges affirmed
the decision while Marshall, Washington, and Story dissented. However, he offers

no evidence to support this position. 2 CRosscSKY, POLnCS AND THE CONSITrUTION

782 (1953).
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The following year Story disregarded the Hudson-Goodwin3 ° deciA3 that the Constitution
sion and ruled in United States v. Coolidge
provided the basis for a federal criminal law.32 Three years elapsed
before the Court reviewed Story's circuit case. Again, by a per
curiam vote, Story's colleagues repudiated his constitutional theory
and left standing the Hudson-Goodwin ratio.m Loyal to Marshall's
desire for unanimity on the bench, Story refused to dissent for a
second time, although he remained firmly convinced that a federal
34
common law of crimes existed and was enforceable by federal courts.
Unable to convince a majority of his brethren, Story went outside
the Court either to lobby for judicial reform by code or to write
model treatises of the law.35 Story proposed two methods of revising
the criminal law. One was a general revision of all criminal laws
bringing into line those laws inconsistent with each other in the
various states. The revisal procedure, he admitted, was difficult and
probably would not be accomplished except by persons "long and
intimately acquainted with the administration of criminal justice in
the Courts of the United States."36 The second approach was federal
legislation extending the common law to include offenses committed
on the high seas and admiralty cases as well as municipal crimes.
Such a course of action was perfectly feasible and could be accomplished, he felt, in the single section of a bill. 7
There has been, however, considerable confusion in the past as to
Story's purpose in proposing model codes. Some writers have contended that he sought to change the American legal system and in
30. Supra note 28.
31. 25 Fed. Cas. 619 (No. 14857) (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
32. Ibid.
33. United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
34. Story wrote: "Excepting Judge Chase, every Judge that ever sat on the
Supreme Court Bench, from the adoption of the Constitution until 1804 (as I have
been very authoratively informed), held a like opinion. Since that time, there has
been a difference on the Bench, and it is still a question which we all hold unsettled.
I believe, however, that none of us entertain any doubt as to the authority of
Congress to invest us with this jurisdiction, so far as it applies to the sovereignty of
the United States." MSS of 1816 probably addressed to William Pinkney, 1 LIFE
Am LL-rrEaRs OF JosEPH SToRY 293-300 (Story ed. 1851). But see United States v.
Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1816).
35. Chancellor Kent once suggested to Story that his Commentaries contained
"Too much of foreign discussion & authority .... ." Story explained, "I could not
well see, how I could avoid introducing it without leaving future accounts in
ignorance of important sources of information, & even without bringing up the
knowledge of the learned in the common law some views of principles which had
carried continental jurists in an opposite light...." Joseph Story to Chancellor
Kent, May 17, 1834, Story MSS, Mass. Hist. Soc. 27.
36. Joseph Story to John McPherson Berrien, July 23, 1842, 2 LiFE AND LETTEzs oF
JOSEPH SToNY 406 (Story ed. 1851).
37. Joseph Story to John McPherson Berrien, Feb. 8, 1842, Id. at 402.
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its place erect a Continental code.m Story's personal papers do not

bear out such charges. In an unpublished letter Story presented his
philosophy of codes in the following manner:
A ... code, recognising in a fixed form & in a lucid way & (which) had
the great principles of . . . law, would of itself be a very great public
Helping. In my view the great object of a code . . . ought not to be, so
much the formation of new principles for future cases, as the positive
enactment, as fundamental, of those, which have been already

. . .

acted

upon, & affirmed.
A revision of a Code once in fifty years by embodying in a fixed shape
the addition of new principles & the limitations & exploitations of old ..
made in the intermediate period, by the highest Courts of Justice, would
perpetually bring the law into a state approximating the exactness of
Science. 3 9
Story, then, had a dual purpose in his attempts to systematize American criminal law. First, by saying what the law was and documenting

it by historical references he sought to prevent a premature, crude
codification. 40 And while he was an admirer of Continental codes,
he nevertheless, realized that the common law was much more imprecise and plastic, suiting his needs in re-directing American juris-

prudence.41 Secondly, Story desired unity in the law at a time when

the states
local elements both on the bench, in Congress and 4 in
dreams of federalism. 2

threatened to upset his cherished

IV.

FEDERAL JUrMsDIMcroN

Justice John Marshall had laid the constitutional basis in Marbury
v. Madison4 3 for the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. But
the decision did not settle all the questions arising from article III of
the Constitution. It left unresolved three specific problems: (1) what
was the maximum grant of judicial power vested in the federal
courts?; (2) to what degree could the Congress control the Supreme
38. See the arguments pro and con in REuscnLEw 52.
39. Joseph Story to Thomas Grimke, c. 1827, Weld-Grimke MSS, William C.
Clements Library.
40. See James Kent to Joseph Story, June 30, 1823, Story MSS, Massachusetts
Historical Society, 18, 28.
41. He used the idea of codes, Reuschlein states "only to build up the common
law and not as a wedge to pry open the door so that another system might ease its
way in." REuscHLan 52.
42. Story worked very closely with Francis Lieber in his attempts to present to
the world a unified system of American jurisprudence. See Joseph Story to Francis
Lieber, Lieber MSS, Huntington Library, Jan. 14, 1837; Dec. 19, 1837; Apr. 10,
1836; Feb. 9, 1836; July 30, 1835; Oct. 14, 1835; Aug. 16, 1834; July 28, 1833;
Mar. 22, 1833; Dec. 19, 1831; Dec. 15, 1831; Oct. 6, 1831; Feb. 23, 1831; Aug. 5, 1830;
July 29, 1830; Dec. 15, 1829; Oct. 17, 1829; Apr. 17, 1829; Nov. 22, 1828.
43. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Court with respect to its appellate jurisdiction?; and (3) to what

extent could the Court declare acts of state legislatures unconstitutional? The dramatic struggle between the nationalists on the nation's
highest bench and the legal officers who championed states' rights
highlighted the Marshall-Story era.44
The major difficulty was traceable to the compromises of the Constitutional Convention. Article III reflected a balance of interests. It
was an uneasy accommodation between the majoritarians (nationalists) who wanted exclusive original jurisdiction for the Supreme
Court and the minoritarians (states' righters) who wanted to preselve
the substantive and procedural law of the states even in cases when
national law was at stake. The Judiciary Act of 1789, of course, was
a victory for the nationalists since it created a national judicial system
with appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. But the specific
details of appellate jurisdiction for the high Court were worded carelessly. Thus the basis for conflict between the nation and the states
45
was ensured before the ink of the signers of the Constitution was dry.
From the outset two rival groups attempted to control each other.
Federalist judges read the Judiciary Act of 1789 as one which
extended the jurisdiction of lower federal courts. This action was
taken with the expectation that local law "would not bar enforcement of federal laws." 46 State judges, however, disagreed with these
interpretations. They believed there was no mandate from Congress
derived from the spirit of the Constitution that gave countenance to
4
Federalist doctrines. 1
The Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison48 had challenged a
national law and declared it unconstitutional. The question remained,
however, whether the Court should have the right to review state
acts and declare them null and void. This issue was considered at
the Constitutional Convention. Proposals to curb hostile state acts
ranged from a congressional veto to federal appointment of state
governors. In the end all the plans were rejected. 49 There remained,
nonetheless, a hard core of federal judges who believed that the
power to void state acts rested with them. In Fletcher v. Peck,50
Chief Justice Marshall put their theory into practice over the objections of numerous state judges and the Congress. He ruled that the
Supreme Court had the right of jurisdiction over acts of the state
44. See MASON & LEAcr, IN QuEST OF FIREEoM: AmERICAN PoLrncAL
A PRACCE 167-227 (1960).
45. HurST, THE GROWTH oF AwmucAN LAw 116 (1950).
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Supra note 43.
49. MASON & LEACH, op. cit. supranote 44, at 156-57.
50. Supra note 12.

THOUGHT
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legislature.5 ' But that case had come up via the federal courts and
the reversal of state court decisions was not at stake. The question
remained moot until Story's decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.52
A. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee produced one of the most sweeping
decisions that Story ever issued concerning the judicial supremacy
of the Supreme Court over the states.53 Story divided his opinion
into three parts. First, he discussed the constitutional power allotted
to the Congress and the federal courts as found in the Constitution.
He believed that the people had granted the Supreme Court powers
to limit state actions which were incompatible with the objects of
the national government. Hence, he assumed that the high Court did
54
not depend on state sovereignty to determine its proper jurisdiction.
The second, and major question presented in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee concerned the question as to whether Congress was obligated
to establish inferior federal courts, bestow appellate jurisdiction on
them, and give these courts a free hand in choosing the law to be
followed. 55 Story felt that if Congress refused to create lower federal
courts, in all probability the judicial power would be frustrated and
the Constitution disobeyed. Similarly, it seemed to be a correct
assumption that Congress could not withhold appellate jurisdiction
any more than it could prevent the Court from possessing original
jurisdiction. The judicial power, Story wrote, extended to all cases
in law and equity enumerated in the Constitution. But apart from
federal questions the Court's jurisdiction also extended to state
tribunals. The power of the Supreme Court over federal appellate
jurisdiction was exclusive and the operative56 rules of law to be applied
were those of the federal not state courts.
Story chose to rebut the states' righters who contended that extension of federal appellate jurisdiction was an encroachment upon state
sovereignty.
It is a mistake, [to aver] that the constitution was not designed to operate
upon states, in their corporate capacities. It is crowded with provisions
which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the states, in some of the
The language of the constitution
highest branches of their prerogatives ....
51. Ibid.
52. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
53. Charles Warren contended that Story's personal experience with the New England
Federalists' attacks on the judiciary convinced him of the necessity for the Supreme
Court to assert its powers over the states. 1 WARREN, THE SUPRFME COURT i
UNITED STATES HISTORY

51 (1923).

54. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, supra note 52, at 328-29.
55. Id. at 331.
56. Id. at 340.
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is also imperative upon the states, as to the perfornmance of many duties....
When, therefore, the states are stripped of some of the highest attributes of
sovereignty, and the same are given to the United States; when the legislatures of the states are, in some respects, under the control of congress,
and in every case are, under the constitution, bound by the paramount
authority of the United States; it is certainly difficult to support the
argument, that the appellate power over the decisions of state courts is
contrary to the genius of our institutions. The courts of the United States
can, without question, revise the proceedings of the executive and legislative authorities of the states, and if they are found to be contrary to the
constitution, may declare them to be of no legal validity. Surely, the exercise
of the same right over5 7judicial tribunals is not a higher or more dangerous
act of sovereign power.

State judges, Story emphasized, were not independent entities.
They were pledged to support the federal as well as the state constitution. Loyalty to the Constitution was also prompted out of a desire
for uniformity. The purpose of a Constitution was to make federal law
the supreme law of the land. If state judges differed in "learning

and integrity," if they represented diverse geographical units, or if
the Supreme Court lacked the power to review state court decisions,

then the future of constitutional law would be jeopardized.
The third and final topic considered by Story was the removal

power. No express constitutional provision could be found allowing
Congress to sanction the removal of cases from state courts to federal
courts when a federal question was at stake. Spencer Roane and
numerous state judges had been severely critical of this part of
section 25 of the Judiciary Act. But the clamor of southern state

judges did not change Story's mind. Removal was implied "as 5 a9
power necessary and proper to carry into effect some express power."
Removal was an effective method of achieving federal appellate
jurisdiction and a writ of error was the proper remedy to guarantee

protection against arbitrary state action. In short, federal courts
public and private interests would
had to have removal power or else
0
6
be exposed to irreparable harm.

B. The Swift v. Tyson Doctrine
From the outset the Federalists had favored strong federal courts
with virtually unlimited powers. Anti-federalists wanted to avoid a
federal system altogether, placing great reliance on state tribunals.
Although the Federalists won out eventually at the Constitutional
57.
58.
59.
60.
ever,

Id. at 343-44.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349.
On questions of national supremacy Story was a strict majoritarian; when, howthe matter concerned property, he became a supporter of minority rights.
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Convention by achieving a federal court system, there were still
fundamental issues of jurisdiction and law to be resolved. One such
procedural debate between the nation and the states was diversity
litigation.
The Federalists had wanted federal courts to be placed on a
broad footing. Thus they proposed in 1789 that when cases and
controversies "between citizens of diverse states" arose the federal
courts should be able to hear and settle the law. 61 Federalists desired
a national interpretation for at least two distinct reasons: they feared
out-of-state litigants would be treated unfairly in state court trials,
and they believed that people of the commercial classes would receive
better treatment in a less prejudiced federal rather than in a hostile,
debtor-controlled state court. They were probably correct in both
of their assumptions. The real difficulty lay, however, not in determining federal diversity
suits, but in finding the correct law to
62
apply in federal courts.
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act was worded very ambiguously. It
spoke of the "laws of the several states." Did this mean state decisional laws as well as state statutory laws? Charles Warren, a keen
student of the Court and the early legal history of the country, has
said "Yes." 63 Others have interpreted the act as a restraint on federal
power. A second query-Was there a federal common law of the
United States?-remained unanswered until 1834.6 Then in a famous
but now forgotten lawsuit involving two Supreme Court ReportersHenry Wheaton and Richard Peters-the Court as obiter dicta
stated
65
that "there can be no common law of the United States."
The denial of federal common law was not Justice Story's understanding of the constitutional system. He had proposed a federal
criminal code based on uniform common law principles. Unable
to realize this goal he turned his sights on transforming the jungle
of the commercial world into a more stable and consistent system of
negotiable instruments modeled on the experience of continental
jurisprudence. Starting as early as 1835 Story attempted in a great
number of circuit decisions to apply either his own interpretation
the state law was or to use an analogy to a federal common
of what
66
law.

op. cit. supra note 53, at 362.
62. HuRsT, op. cit. supra note 45, 110.
63. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 -LuAv.
61. See 2 WARmRE,

L. RiEv. 49 (1923).
64. JAcKsoN, TR

STRUcLE FOR JUDICL L SUPnMACY 273 (1941).

65. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
66. See, e.g., Briggs v. French, 4 Fed. Cas. 117 (No. 1871) (C.C.D. Mass. 1835);
Donnell v. Columbian Insurance Co., 7 Fed. Cas. 889 (No. 3987) (C.C.D. Mass. 1836);
Flagg v. Mann. 9 Fed. Cas. 289 (No. 4847) (C.C.D. Mass. 1837); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 29 Fed. Cas. 1402 (No. 17738) (C.C.D. Mass. 1838).
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Story also labored quite strenuously between 1828 and 1842 to
refine diversity jurisdiction and to build up a corpus of commercial
law. He rejected earlier Supreme Court decisions which departed
from his views-e.g., Justice Iredell's opinion in Maxwel's Lessee v.
Levy 67 limiting federal judicial power over state bills and notes was
Iredell and his like, said Story, were
"wholly unsatisfactory."6
jurisdiction and they assumed that the
of
federal
jealous
extremely
federal courts were unable to extend their jurisdictional authority.
This decision had misinterpreted congressional intent. Thus by focusing his attention on one overriding objective Story was able to hammer
away at the proposition that on questions of diversity litigation and
commercial law the courts of the United States were not precluded
from discovering the law and were not bound by the local construction
to achieve
stemming from state courts. The climax of Story's battle
69
commercial uniformity was realized in Swift v. Tyson.
C. Swift v. Tyson
Justice Story had waited a long time to deliver his legal opinion in
Swift v. Tyson. It was certainly a strange thing that the decision
was handed down in the Taney era. But in retrospect, John Marshall,
while a nationalist in terms of congressional powers, was not a proponent of general theories of law. What Story accomplished in Swift
v. Tyson was the establishment of a federal common law in commercial matters. 0 Story ruled that the New York law of negotiable
instruments did not have to be followed by the federal courts since
the law was derived from New York's interpretation of the general
common law. No local practice, custom, procedure, or statute, he said,
was involved.
The defendant had argued that the law of New York should govern
the case. He further contended that the New York law as expounded
by its courts had held in similar cases that such a contractual relationship did not constitute a pre-existing debt for valuable consideration. Justice Story said he had studied the New York decisions.
While the Supreme Court of New York had ruled against the debt,
the Court of Errors (Chancellor Kent's bailiwick) had never made
an official pronouncement.7 1 Furthermore, certain recent cases had
67. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 381 (1798).

See also Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)

330 (1797).
68. Briggs v. French, supra note 66, at 122; Tobey v. Clafin, 23 Fed. Gas. 1323
(No. 14066) (C.C.D. Mass. 1838).
69. 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1842).

70. Two studies which tend to be critical of Swift v. Tyson are JAcKsog, THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL Supm- .s cy 273; and HvnsT, op. cit. supra note 45, at 110.
71. Swift v. Tyson, supra note 69, at 18.
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"greatly shaken, if... not entirely overthrown those decisions .... -72
Therefore, the New York courts had admitted at least a serious doubt
as to the application of the law. But it was also questionable, Justice
Story reasoned, even if the highest court in New York had developed
a legal doctrine, whether it was binding on the federal courts when
"from principles established in the general commercial
it differed
law." 3
Since the defense had raised a doubt as to the proper interpretation
of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, Story took it upon himself to
clarify its meaning. The word "laws" in ordinary language usage did
not include state decisions. They were, "at most, only evidence of
what the laws are and are not of themselves laws." 74 He averred
that the Supreme Court had uniformly accepted this interpretation of
the clause in question. The Court had limited state law to mean both
positive statutes and their construction by local tribunals.7 5 Rules of
decision, then, would be governed by federal interpretation of the
common law. State decisions would be shown the proper respect and
attention but they were not binding on federal courts. To Story
the law of negotiable instruments-the historic growth of the law
merchant-was "not the law of a single country only, but a law of
the commercial world."' 6 Thus was born the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson: the development of commercial jurisprudence.
V. SUMMARY

Justice Story's concern for the protection of individual rights forced
him to accept certain myths. Freedom of contract (i.e., the impairment of the obligation of contract) was a confusion of public interest,
legal rights and natural law. In the Dartmouth case Story demonstrated his grand design to relate the contract clause to a theory
of natural law and thus place the principles of constitutional government beyond the pale of legislative control. 7 In this respect he
was unable to draw definitively the lines between legitimate acts of
to be unconstitutional
state legislatures and those which he deemed
8
and subversive of a well-ordered society.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Ibid.
ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

76. Ibi.
cRAN INTERPtT.ATIONs OF NATURAL LA-w (1931).
77. See Wrmcnr, A
78. In his zeal to maximize freedom by utilizing absolute precepts of law, Story was

actually limiting the freedom of many groups. Unfortunately, in Story's lifetime lie
was unable to reconcile theories of external constraint and individual freedom. Indeed,
it was a dilemma for most nineteenth-century jurists. The following works treat this
subject:
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Story also proposed an "untenable" theory of the public interest at
a time when doctrines of popular sovereignty-the right of universal
suffrage, unrestricted limitations on office holding, and the growth
of state legislative supremacy reflecting majority will-were finding
their way to the Supreme Court. Here we can detect a clash between
the fundamental rights as known to the common law and Story's
personal social, economic, and political interests which had been
9
fixed by his education, professional associations, and class interests.7
There was, as Dean Pound tells us, a complete distortion of the
common law by the attempt to force it into an alignment with a law
of God. "The common law rested on the idea that reason, not
arbitrary will, should be the measure of action and of decision."8°
Story, on the other hand, in the vested rights cases used the natural
law as a lever to promote his own group interests. The impact of
Story's natural law theories remained at the beck and call of late
nineteenth-century conservatives. These theories ultimately led to
arbitrary law and the guardians of special interests were quick to
rediscover that the same great principles could be justified in SocialDarwinism. 81
In sum, the legal myths perpetuated by Justice Story amounted to
a rationalist theocracy of the law. Only the judges could know all
the truth. For Story, the supposed task of the justice was to discover
the law and once having found it-to make it conform to his own
concept of the public will. This rationalistic philosophy did not
promote the scientific study of the law. It did not even provide
for a growth of the law by taxonomy. Rather, it tended to make
the individual judge the sole seeker and purveyor of the law, which,
of course, was unsound democratically. Natural rights as Story
expressed them were not prescriptions of the law which rational men
could easily locate. Instead such rights were normative concepts
which men ought to attain. What Story did was to codify normative
goals into positive legal concepts. In effect, then, Story's decisions
which employed natural law theories were not empirical laws since
the validity of such valuational opinions could neither be proved nor
disproved scientifically. 2
Joseph Story's grand design for a codification of the federal common
(1962); DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC TnEoRy (1956);
TIVIsm (1963).

SHUMAN,

LEGAL Posr-

79. Schubert, The Theoy of "The Public Interest" in Judicial Decision-Making, 2
MIDWEST J. POL. 1-15 (1958).
80. PoUND, THE SpnuT OF THE COMMON LAw 96-97 (1921).
81. HoFsTADTEm, SocIL&DAmism
rN AmimuN
ThoUGrr (1955).
82. Two perceptive studies which deal with legal reasoning are: Ross, ON LAW AND
Jus-ncE (1959); KELsEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? (1963). Cf. RADCLiFF , Tim LAw AN
rrs CoMNA.ss (1960).
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law of crimes was not realized in his lifetime. In fact, the nineteenthcentury legislative mind was firmly opposed to any notions of
codifying statutory or common law. At best the relationship between
judge and legislator was an uneasy alliance. Instinctively legislators
distrusted judges and lawyers who expounded what the law was
and what it ought to be. By the same token members of the bench
and bar were highly critical of legislative skills, especially statutes
protecting the rights of people (i.e., property rights) in the society.
The atmosphere was not conducive to change. 3
One might be led to believe that nineteenth-century lawyers and
judges favored reform of the criminal law. This was not the case.
Indeed it can be said with some certainty that the courts in general
were exceedingly conservative in changing the rules of the administration of justice. Nineteenth-century jurists were historicists: they
feared the excesses which had flowed from the French Revolution and
they were determined to control the popular ideas circulating about
reform. Furthermore, American jurists believed in the conservative
philosophy of respecting the continuity of institutions, traditions, and
doctrines. Few jurists then spoke out to improve the law. Their
time was spent in worshipping the cult of local jurisprudence. 84
As a result of this provincial attitude toward a developing legal
system, nineteenth-century criminal law was made purposely narrow
by various competing groups in Congress and the courts. The law
reflected more the social problems of the eighteenth century than the
complex issues of an increasingly urban nineteenth-century society.
Story's reputation as a great judge is rarely attributed to his work in
criminal law. And yet in reviewing his record it would seem to be
an act of impropriety not to include his contributions to this vital
area of American jurisprudence.P
The Supreme Court traditionally has attempted to achieve a sense
of national unity by answering general questions of law-but for
Justice Story this was not enough. Far too many times he felt that
Marshall, and more especially Taney, were reluctant to expand the
Court's authority. Story was firmly convinced that the national government through its courts were the only logical agencies capable of
solving internal conflicts. 8 For instance, the debate between federal
83. PoUND, THE FoRm ATnrE EA OF A mmucAN LAw (1950).

84. PouND, Tim SPDUT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921).
85. See Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 1 MASS.
L.Q. 121 (1916).
86. Francis Lieber respected Story's application of common law to fit .the needs of a
new age and he admired Story's Hamiltonian interpretation of federalism. He "felt
the positive law inadequate as a guide to the new order." FRiEDEL, FRANCIS LIEDrii
NxNrTEEN-CENTumy LmmuAL 151 (1947). See also Story, Value and Importance
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and state jurisdiction, which was a hindrance to the development of
a truly consistent national law in the nineteenth century, appears to
be a settled question today. Story's decision in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee is still the landmark case extending federal jurisdiction of the
87
Supreme Court.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee was a significant decision for several
reasons. First, it highlighted the struggle between the federal government and the states by calling into play the power of federal judicial
review over state legislation and state court judgments. Justice
Story read section 25 of the Judiciary Act as providing the full locus
of power for judicial review-a power which he believed was absolutely essential to maintain national supremacy of law. 88 Secondly, but
of equal importance, was Story's ruling on the power to remove cases
from state courts to federal jurisdiction. The supremacy of federal
law over state law was emphasized as binding on both governmental
units. Today, removal of federal suits is provided for in the Federal
Rules for Civil Procedure and it is considered to be a substantial
aspect of procedural due process. 9
A third effect of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee was, of course, to affirm
the power of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction of the inferior federal
courts. Not content with asserting congressional prerogative over this
area, Story in some obiter dicta declared that it was incumbent on
Congress to create lower courts vesting them with complete jurisdiction.90 Conversely, Congress would be restricted in taking away such
jurisdiction once it had been conferred. With respect to the plenary
power of Congress over jurisdiction, it must be noted that this
concept has not received the support Story desired. Instead, both by
legislative fiat and judicial interpretation the power of Congress as
to what kinds of jurisdiction it may grant to federal courts has been
narrowly construed. 91 This did not mean Congress was unable to
create and confer broad jurisdiction. Rather, it reflected an attitude
of restricting federal authority especially in cases of dual sovereignty.
The reverse proposition-that what Congress makes it may destroyhas met with some stiff resistance from the courts. In this light
of Legal Studies in THE MISCELLANEOUS WSTINcS

OF JOSEPH STORY 504-44 (Story
ed. 1852).
87. Albert Beveridge wrote: "During the entire twenty-four years that Marshall
and Story were together on the Supreme Bench the Chief Justice sought and accepted
the younger man's judgment and frankly acknowledged his authority in every variety
of legal questions, excepting only those of international law or the interpretation of
the Constitution." 4 BEvErIGE, LIF. OF JonN MA.HaS
L 1270 (1919).
88. See FoRmRs=E, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 52-53 (2d ed. 1950).
89. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-50 (1958).
90. Story expanded this view in his Commentaries. CONSTrrTxON OF THE UNITED
STATES 616 (Corwin ed. 1953).
91. Ibid.
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Martin v. Hunter's Lessee stands at the top of an impressive array of
precedents asserting that Congress could not destroy the judicial
92
power of federal courts.
Finally, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee announced that state courts had
a definite obligation to guarantee due process of law. In effect this
meant that Supreme Court decisions affecting states or the federal
government had to be accepted by all as the supreme law of the
land. Rejection of the Court's authority implied violation of the
national will. This aspect of the case later proved to be the backbone
of the Court's enforcement power. In the twentieth century the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that article VI still stands as the
93
nation's supreme law.
So, too, there are few cases in American constitutional law which
have created more interest and generated more heated controversy
than the Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson.94 Story had a direct
interest in nurturing the commercial law. He was regarded as one
of the great nineteenth century experts in this field, both in Europe,
England and the United States. In his own country, he had been
dubbed the "commercial justice." This sobriquet was achieved as the
result of his multiple volumes on commercial law, the legion of
cases he handed down while on the bench and as a result of the role
he played as commercial law professor at Harvard Law School.9 5
Story's purpose in developing a continental approach for a national
system of commercial transactions was easy to understand. He wanted
to allow the business world, of which he was an integral part, to
enjoy equal privileges and immunities from state to state. If a note
were discounted in Massachusetts or a stop-payment order issued on
an instrument in Virginia, he wanted identical principles of law to
apply in each case. State discrimination against foreign creditors was
his bete noire.6
Prior to 1842, the Supreme Court as a group, including John
Marshall, had avoided a direct clash with the states on rules of
92. See the able discussion in 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 811-17
(1953).
93. "The decision of the Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee went further
than any previous judicial pronouncements to establish the relation between National
courts and state tribunals which now exists and will continue as long as the Republic
endures." 4 BEvmDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 166 (1919); 1 LIFE AND LErrms
OF JOsEPH STORY 277 (Story ed. 1851).
94. 2 CRossKEY, op. cit. supra note 92, at 859-64.
95. In 1840 Story was nominated to membership in the French Institute. See
Charles Sumner to David B. Warden, May 28, 1838, Warden MSS, Maryland Historical
Society.
96. CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAw, REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS IN MASSACHUSEITS TO DETRiNE EXPED NCY OF REDUCIG COMMON LAW To CODE, op. cit. supra

note 86, at 698-734.
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decision by avoiding Story's uniformity doctrine.

Such indecision,

had, in reality, placed the Court in a dilemma. Story contended that
if the Court followed state decisions in diversity suits involving
important financial questions, one rule of law which was upheld one
day might be declared unconstitutional in a different case the next
day. Other more states' rights-minded justices felt that if the federal
courts made the rules they would tend to be uniform but not binding
in state court decisions. In a very real sense, then, Story actually
overturned the Supreme Court's early handling of the rules of decision
in diversity litigation. Swift v. Tyson provided a magnificent example
of policy-making by the federal judiciary and remained the law of
the land for ninety-six years. 97
Since Justice Story believed himself both free to discover the law
and to make it, the question naturally arises: How far did he intend
to extend the Swift doctrine? Reading between the lines of this
important decision (plus two other Supreme Court cases in which
Story used a similar line of reasoning) we can only conclude that
Story distinguished between commercial and non-commercial law.
Concerning the former, rules of decision were to be made by the
federal courts. In all other cases the states were free to construe
their own laws, statutes, etc. If Story had lived another generation
he might have been convinced that the federal courts could have
constitutionally included all law as within their purview.9 However,
he never professed this opinion and the immediate results of Swift v.
Tyson cannot be attributed solely to him.9
In assessing Story's legal philosophy, then, we find there are two
sides to the man. One is the legal absolutist who sought to establish
an ideal type of law based on a priori reasoning and linked to a theory
of natural law. Story's deductive historicism, which was blended
with eighteenth-century rationalism was often directly in conflict
with Jacksonian democracy. Doctrines such as the preservation of
97. See Frankfurter, Distribution of judicial Power between United States and States
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson:
A DramaticEpisode, 24 A.B.A.J. 609 (1938).
98. Such was the opinion of Justice Daniels in Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 517 (1855).
99. Nevertheless, many writers on the Court have placed the responsibility for the
application of the general common law to Story. Frank, MAnBLE PALAcE 22; JACKSON,
op. cit. supra note 64, at 273. Contemporary scholars of public law generally support
Story's contention that the commercial world needs to be unified. Despite the steps
taken by many state and federal agencies (e.g., Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Uniform Sales Act, Uniform Commercial Code,
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Federal Bankruptcy Act, Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act to name just a few) there persists, in the words of Dean Pound, "disquieting symptoms of provincial interpretations in the several states which would
involve a gradual return to our former condition of divergent local law" if they
continued to be supported. PouND, op. cit. supra note 77, at 55.
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property, the protection of contractual rights, the limitations on
creditors, and the abhorrence of public university suffered severe
limitations when applied in a purely deductive manner. Even Story's
skillful use of the comparative method was frequently an attempt to
establish causal relationships toward an ideal-type law. 10 But the other
side of Story-that of the judicial empiricist who promoted a national
concept of law through judicial review-holds much to be admired.
His attempts to employ the common law as the basis of a national
criminal jurisprudence, his constant search to codify criminal and
commercial law, his use of judicial review to promote a nationalistic
conception of the central government by expanding federal jurisdiction were significant contributions to the development of American
public law. 101
In summary, Story's legal philosophy helped him to solidify two
important aspects of our common law system. He preserved the
doctrine of stare decisis by emphasizing its role in producing stability
in the law. And he advanced the theory of the supremacy of national
law as found in article VI of the Constitution, thus strengthening the
foundations of constitutionalism. Although he was prone to all the
weaknesses of his logic and vanity, there existed within him the spark
of judicial empiricism. Few men on the bench have matched Justice
10 2
Joseph Story's judicial creativeness.
100. The works of Morris Cohen are especially helpful in this type of analysis.
LAw AND SociAL ORmER (1933); REAsoN An LAW:
(1960); AmEwcAN TxoucErr (1954).
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101. Supra note 85.
102. John Frank takes a different view of Story's creative genius. "Joseph Story
was a great worker, but it might be contended with a touch of fairness that he was
merely an industrious hack." Nonetheless, Frank ranks Story as one of the great
scholars of the bench. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE 64.

